=pod
=head1 NAME
RSA_public_encrypt, RSA_private_decrypt - RSA public key cryptography
=head1 SYNOPSIS
#include
int RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
int RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
=head1 DESCRIPTION
RSA_public_encrypt() encrypts the B bytes at B (usually a
session key) using the public key B and stores the ciphertext in
B. B must point to RSA_size(B) bytes of memory.
B denotes one of the following modes:
=over 4
=item RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
PKCS #1 v1.5 padding. This currently is the most widely used mode.
=item RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING
EME-OAEP as defined in PKCS #1 v2.0 with SHA-1, MGF1 and an empty
encoding parameter. This mode is recommended for all new applications.
=item RSA_SSLV23_PADDING
PKCS #1 v1.5 padding with an SSL-specific modification that denotes
that the server is SSL3 capable.
=item RSA_NO_PADDING
Raw RSA encryption. This mode should I be used to implement
cryptographically sound padding modes in the application code.
Encrypting user data directly with RSA is insecure.
=back
B must be less than RSA_size(B) - 11 for the PKCS #1 v1.5
based padding modes, less than RSA_size(B) - 41 for
RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING and exactly RSA_size(B) for RSA_NO_PADDING.
The random number generator must be seeded prior to calling
RSA_public_encrypt().
RSA_private_decrypt() decrypts the B bytes at B using the
private key B and stores the plaintext in B. B must point
to a memory section large enough to hold the decrypted data (which is
smaller than RSA_size(B)). B is the padding mode that
was used to encrypt the data.
=head1 RETURN VALUES
RSA_public_encrypt() returns the size of the encrypted data (i.e.,
RSA_size(B)). RSA_private_decrypt() returns the size of the
recovered plaintext.
On error, -1 is returned; the error codes can be
obtained by L.
=head1 WARNING
Decryption failures in the RSA_PKCS1_PADDING mode leak information
which can potentially be used to mount a Bleichenbacher padding oracle
attack. This is an inherent weakness in the PKCS #1 v1.5 padding
design. Prefer RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING.
=head1 CONFORMING TO
SSL, PKCS #1 v2.0
=head1 SEE ALSO
L, L, L,
L
=head1 HISTORY
The B argument was added in SSLeay 0.8. RSA_NO_PADDING is
available since SSLeay 0.9.0, OAEP was added in OpenSSL 0.9.2b.
=cut