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1 This code is still less than perfect and undoubtedly has bugs. As of this
2 release, the following are considered *serious* bugs:
4 * It was our intent for Opportunistic Encryption to work with 4096 bit keys.
5 Currently, there is a buffer limitation that prevents this; the additional
6 text in TXT records wasn't properly factored into the buffer length. If
7 you wish to use a key larger than the default of 2192 bits, keep the size
8 under 4k. This will be fixed in a future release.
10 * Module built against RedHat 7.1 2.4.2 kernels do not forward large packets.
11 The reason for this is unknown. Upgrade to a newer kernel.
13 * If there are multiple connections specified between the same two
14 security gateways, either all or none must specify compression. Otherwise
15 the result is unpredictable.
17 * Pluto will not retry if it can not find its key in DNS when it starts.
19 * Extrusion and Opportunistic Encryption do not mix well without
20 Advanced Routing. (There is a workaround using advanced routing)
22 * Installing a new FreeS/WAN on top of an old one doesn't update kernel
23 configuration options, so if new options are added, you need to start
24 with a virgin kernel instead.
26 * KLIPS cannot cope with IP packets employing IP options. This has
27 caused no trouble that we know of, somewhat to our surprise.
29 * There are some ill-defined problems with sending large packets through
30 transport-mode connections, especially in 2.2.xx kernels.
32 * There appears to be a kernel memory leak if rekeying occurs while a
33 connection is carrying traffic. The effect is small unless you are
34 rekeying very frequently indeed.
36 * There are too many ways for packets to get around the security stuff.
37 In particular, suppose you have the following, with security gateways X
38 and Y serving subnets S and T:
42 A packet which shows up at Y, in clear text, claiming to be from S, with a
43 destination in T, will be forwarded... even if there is an IPsec tunnel
44 between X and Y which ought to be encrypting all such packets. The damage
45 such packets could do is limited, but denial-of-service attacks are an
46 obvious possibility. Dealing with this is difficult in general, because
47 we aren't quite close enough yet to the center of the IP processing
48 machinery. For now, careful firewalling is needed.
50 * Another "packet leak" arises because at startup, shutdown, or restart,
51 there is a brief period when the network is up but IPsec is not. This
52 exposure can be reduced using the forwardcontrol parameter.
54 * A similar leak occurs because there is no simple way to *replace* a
55 route using the Linux 2.2.xx route(8) command. It has to be done with a
56 delete/add sequence, which leaves a timing window in which there is no
57 route for the destination. Workarounds are complex; firewalling is
58 probably the best countermeasure right now.
60 * Yet another potential leak arises because the PF_KEYv2 replace form of
61 addroute command is non-atomic. There is a possibility for packets to
62 slip through the eroute table to a more general eroute between deletion
63 and addition of an eroute. This is usually of no importance because the
64 packets will generally end up getting dropped rather than forwarded.
66 * Minor difficulties can arise if more than one subnet is behind a single
67 security gateway, e.g.:
73 If U wants to talk to S encrypted, but T wants to talk to S in clear (no
74 IPsec), it actually is possible... but it has to be done with manual
75 keying's %passthrough feature, which is a little messy if the U-S
76 connection is automatically keyed, because the two connections share a
77 route but Pluto is not aware of this.
79 * The number of IPsec interfaces is coded at 4, but can be
80 changed by editing linux/net/ipsec/ipsec_param.h. It can not
81 adjusted dynamically at run-time, which is the bug.
83 * When building as a module, there is a memory leak when loading/unloading
84 several times. We have not identified the source of this leak. It is on
85 the order of 8k. As we expect some turbulence in the kernel component
86 in the early months of 2003, we are not going to pursue this at this time.
87 Our test case, module-memory-01 therefore fails.
89 This file is RCSID $Id: BUGS,v 1.55 2004/04/10 04:28:28 sam Exp $